By Andrew Heck

Canadian consumers are demanding an explanation for the sticker shock they are experiencing at the grocery store.

In July 2022, general inflation in Canada was close to eight per cent – a four-decade high – cooling down to below five per cent in April 2023 and expected to move lower yet heading into 2024. Food price inflation, however, has continued to hover around 10 per cent for about a year. Even as general inflation eases, food price inflation does not appear to have followed suit.

Coincidentally, in the past year, profit margins for Canada’s major grocers were upwards of 10 per cent. Meanwhile, on the side of food production and processing, higher input costs, lower commodity prices and other factors have spelled negative margins for hog farmers and meatpackers.

When it comes to explaining why Canadians’ grocery bills are so steep, little of substance has been provided by those who know why or have the ability to do something about it. Grocery executives continue to pay themselves generously while shoppers watch their weekly bills get bigger. While it is impossible to offer a comprehensive explanation for all food categories, which stakeholders are making the most off struggling consumers?

Producers, processors and retailers are all within their rights to concern themselves with their bottom lines. Capitalism, at the end of the day, still reigns supreme in all parts of the value chain, just as in most sectors of our economy. While profit motive undoubtedly belongs in the equation, it would be inaccurate to suggest all stakeholders have been raking in the dough. The closer you look, the more obvious it becomes.

In the Canadian pork value chain, for years, producers and now processors have seemed to absorb a greater proportion of the mounting costs that retailers are able to recoup simply by charging more for their goods. As Canada’s grocery sector has steadily moved in the direction of oligopoly – with fewer and fewer legitimate choices – has big business finally reached a tipping point when it comes to providing essential food products and services, fairly, for Canadians?

As time goes on, consumers are rapidly losing faith in the belief that the cutthroat practices of large-scale supermarkets are leading to greater purchasing power for them. Certainly, the data – or lack of transparency around it – is making the disparity plain to see.

Grocers garner harsh criticism

Starting from the most visible part of the agri-food value chain, grocery stores were once trusted as ethical, people-minded enterprises that play a crucial role in any community. While at least part of that assumption remains true, skepticism has become a popular perspective.

When COVID-19 struck in early 2020, short-term losses for grocers quickly mounted, in response to gathering restrictions imposed by government and a need for physical distancing, masking and sanitation. As grocery employees were considered essential frontline works, several grocers began offering ‘hero pay’ to recognize and retain employees. At the time, it was surmised these necessary adaptations could account for immediate food price increases. While reasonable-sounding, pandemic living eventually became the norm. With restrictions already well-established, employee incentives were taken away, but prices kept climbing.

Executives from Canada’s three largest grocers – Loblaw Companies Ltd., Empire Company Ltd. and Metro Inc. – were summoned before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food in early March to clarify the connection between food prices and corporate profits.

Those questioned included Galen Weston Jr., Chairman & President, Loblaw, with more than 2,400 stores in all provinces, including Real Canadian Superstore, No Frills, Zehrs and Provigo; Michael Medline, President & CEO, Empire, with more than 1,500 stores in all provinces, including Sobeys, Canada Safeway, Thrifty Foods and Longo’s; and Eric La Flèche, President & CEO, Metro, with nearly 1,000 namesake, Super-C, Food Basics and Marché Ami stores in Quebec and Ontario.

The committee wanted to find out whether current grocery prices equitably reflect the supply chain challenges that have cropped up since the start of COVID-19, when inflation and grocery revenue began to grow in step with each other.

When asked about his company, Weston used the example of a $25 grocery spend and suggested that $24 of that total amount represents accumulated supply costs, while only $1 represents profit for Loblaw.

“If we didn’t raise retail prices as costs went up, the companies that we operate would disappear almost instantly,” he said. “A hundred per cent of the profit in the food industry could go into lower food prices, and the price of the basket for that customer would still be 24 dollars.”

When pressed further to elaborate on his reasoning, Weston doubled down on his analogy, effectively silencing any meaningful inquiry.

“This one dollar of the 25 dollars is what we’re focused on, and all of this time, effort and exposition is focused on that amount,” he said. “No matter what is there – and there isn’t anything of significance there – that isn’t going to change the cost of food.”

When asked about Canada’s incoming grocery code of conduct – which is expected to be in place soon – Weston insisted Loblaw already negotiates with suppliers cooperatively, despite instances of “bad judgment on both sides,” referring to his company and manufacturers.

“We believe that we do business in a fair and transparent way 99 per cent of the time… It’s really important that any code or any set of practices that we engage in are properly balanced,” he said.

That one per cent discrepancy may have been a subtle reference to an earlier controversy that many Canadians will remember: in 2015, Loblaw sister company Weston Foods came under investigation by the Competition Bureau of Canada after being accused of colluding with Canada Bread as part of a price-fixing scheme that artificially inflated bread prices at retail for more than a decade. While the allegations were never proven in court, in 2018, Loblaw reacted by offering $25 gift cards for Canadians to use in its stores – a fitting and precedent-setting amount, foreshadowing the latest debacle.

In early April, just a month after the parliamentary hearing, Loblaw announced that Weston would receive a pay raise this year, based on last year’s stellar performance. Not long after, the company announced it would commit $2 billion to open 38 new stores and renovate 600 others. Certainly, expansion, not stability, remains the dominant mindset for Loblaw, as the company battles with only a handful of others like Empire and Metro – not to mention Costco Canada and Walmart – for highly coveted market share.

Suppliers squashed in several ways

While grocers continue to triumph, in meatpacking, the situation is far less encouraging for business.

When it comes to pork processing, profits for meatpackers were healthy and improving in the years immediately preceding COVID-19, but since 2021, that relationship has worsened from growth, to stagnation, to deficit.

Factors such as reduced access to high-volume pork markets like China, coupled with difficulties around finding workers, have hammered at the earnings of Canada’s largest pork processors, including Maple Leaf Foods, Olymel and HyLife.

Maple Leaf Foods reported its financials for the fourth quarter of 2022 in early March, including a loss of more than $40 million.

A cyber-attack led the list of problems, along with disruptions to the movement of pork and routinely poorly performing plant-based protein, from which the company has continued to lose money since it began investing in meat alternatives in 2017.

However, between 2021 and 2022, Maple Leaf’s sales increased from $4.5 billion to $4.7 billion total. Adjusted earnings for the company’s real meat category, while consistently positive, dipped from $527 million to $379 million, or by 28 per cent. Plant-based proteins managed to lose 17 per cent less, at only $105 million in the red, compared to $127 million the year prior.

Olymel, on the other hand, has faced a protracted series of disappointments in the past year. In November, the company announced the closure of its slaughter facility in St. Hyacinthe, Quebec. Then, in early February, the company closed two further processing plants in Blaineville and Laval, followed by an additional slaughter facility in Vallée-Jonction, in mid-April.

According to the company, “the decision was necessary to stop losses in the fresh pork sector, which have amounted to more than $400 million over the past two years and are jeopardizing the entire company’s profitability.”

In 2019, Olymel acquired rival brand F. Ménard for a handsome, undisclosed amount, consolidating a good chunk of the province’s hog production, integrated with the company’s existing pork processing capacities and related functions, like feed milling and trucking. It was expected that this decision would eventually pay off, but the unfortunate timing, occurring just prior to COVID-19, has proven daunting.

For HyLife, cracks have begun to show more recently, in early April, as the company has struggled to sell off its slaughter facility in Windom, Minnesota, originally purchased in 2020, right as COVID-19 had taken hold. The plant was acquired to increase overall capacity, in addition to HyLife’s main plant in Neepawa, Manitoba.

A common domestic theme for all meatpackers has been a lengthy list of labour concerns. While HyLife never experienced any plant closures due to workers being infected with COVID-19, Maple Leaf’s plant in Brandon, Manitoba; Olymel’s plant in Red Deer, Alberta; and Conestoga Meats’ producer-owned plant in Breslau, Ontario were all shuttered for several weeks due to outbreaks in 2020 and 2021, resulting in disruptions to the supply of pigs and pork.

During the plant outbreaks, at least one worker died as a direct result of contracting COVID-19, causing a news media stir and adding fuel to the fire for critics of the meat industry. On top of that, as temporary and permanent plant closures across the country have resulted in the laying-off of workers, labour rights advocates and unions have pressured governments to adopt stricter measures to protect workers. While the desire to support workers is entirely justified, there is no question the circumstances surrounding those outcries have had the effect of gradually chipping away at processor margins.

Given the examples of Maple Leaf, Olymel and HyLife, it is clear food suppliers have been under the gun more intensely in recent years. In some cases, companies’ misfortunes have resulted from untimely or misguided business decisions, but in other cases, uncontrollable pandemic-related factors have taken a toll that has been felt at both ends of the value chain.

Pig and pork production absorb heavy blows

Hogs raised by Canadian producers – processed at facilities like those owned by Maple Leaf Foods, Olymel, HyLife and a few others – are regulated by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), representing upwards of 99 per cent of total production across the country, though this does not translate to the volume that is sold in Canadian grocery stores, which can include cheaper pork of foreign origin.

Hogs procured by CFIA-inspected processors are priced according to market formulas derived from mandatory, daily reports compiled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which reflects aggregated prices paid by processors to producers in the U.S. In Canada, no such reporting mechanism exists, which has been an ongoing problem that provincial pork producer organizations and the Canadian Pork Council (CPC) have been trying to address for years. Political buy-in has been lukewarm, at best.

Between 2000 and 2020, it is estimated that Canada lost more than three-quarters of all independent hog producers, while consistently growing the size of the country’s total pig herd. This phenomenon is not due to a declining interest in raising pigs or selling pork, but profitability barriers that have made modern agriculture inaccessible without sufficient capital. Partly because of this, one approach by processors has been to vertically integrate their hog supplies by either owning barns outright or independently contracting producers as finishers for more of the hogs that end up at their plants.

This suggests that, while we have fewer farmers making a living off commercial hog production, those few have expanded their operations to make up the difference, as global demand for protein continues its bullish trajectory. As the number of hogs produced has levelled off in recent years, and the number of producers continues to drop, it is easy to speculate as to why, given the situation at-hand.

Since the 1970s, data gathered from the USDA suggests the share of value between producers, processors and retailers has not stayed proportional. Extrapolating this data for a Canadian context is not a perfect comparison, but given the inter-connection between our national industries, the relationship is about as close as we can get without better, currently non-existent data.

Canadian market hogs are priced using processor-specific formulas that reference the USDA’s information, as a starting point. From there, hogs are measured against a ‘grid’ that includes a range of weights falling below or above an ideal target, which sets the starting price. Then, carcasses are assessed for indicators of quality – like fat marbling, loin depth and colour – which may be paid out in the form of premiums and bonuses defined by a producer’s contract.

To evaluate hog prices in a general sense, market analysts use a standardized 100-kilogram ‘dressed’ carcass, referring to one that has been slaughtered and has had most of its non-meat features removed. Considering the financial share of that carcass, one that fetches a producer $200 can be sold by a processor for roughly $300 in profit once broken down into ‘primals,’ or large, basic cuts. Most primals are sold to wholesalers internationally or domestically, to perform further processing in any number of ways.

Fresh or frozen cuts like loin chops, racks of ribs, belly portions and shoulder roasts – along with cured products like bacon, deli meats and sausages – are among some of the many options Canadian consumers have when it comes to purchasing pork in-store. While detailed sales data for these items is not publicly known, even taking a low-end estimate of $8 per kilogram – the price of ground pork at Real Canadian Superstore, as of early 2023 – that would mean the full value of the meat from a hog carcass approaches $800 at retail, which is, conservatively, about four times what a producer earns and at least twice what a processor earns.

While the numbers cited here cannot be exact and are highly variable, a picture of proportionality begins to emerge: producers and processors, together, take home only a meagre slice of the total value of the pig, most of which belongs to the retailer and its middlemen. Granted, these middlemen represent additional input costs for retailers, on top of losses attributed to meat that goes unpurchased and is wasted. However, until retailers choose to shed a brighter light on the breakdown of their costs, as a way to rationalize what they charge and justify their margins, consumers and the rest of the pork value chain are left guessing.

Farmers bear the brunt of the burden

Consider what it takes to get the pig from farm to fork: from ‘farrowing,’ or birth, the pig is raised to market weight at six-months-old, then hauled to the processing plant, where the next steps take a mere matter of days. From there, its outputs are sold and shipped all around the world to end users who may get weeks or months of shelf life out of the product, depending on how it is prepared or stored.

All in all, while processing and retail are indispensable parts of adding value to the hog carcass, most of the time commitment – and much of the up-front risk – lies with the producer. Producers, being at the beginning of the value chain, have little to no recourse when it comes to affecting the prices paid for their pigs, while facing the same unstable market conditions as processors, with none of the mark-up ability of retailers.

While input costs have increased across the board throughout agri-food, livestock feed, energy costs and insurance rates have gone up faster than hog prices. When looking to re-invest into a hog operation, including modernizing barns for eco-efficiency and animal welfare standards, producers have suffered, as the confidence of lenders has eroded. On top of that, if a producer underperforms in another area of his total farm operation, such as reduced crop yields during an off-year, government-funded business risk management (BRM) programs are often insufficient to balance out total losses.

With everything considered, it is hardly short of miraculous that many of Canada’s food producers are able to stay afloat at all. 

Market downturns make it tougher

Market conditions for pigs and pork took a sharp turn, starting in late 2018, with the outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF) in China. Almost overnight, pork values for processors jumped dramatically as China looked to fill the void left by widespread culling of animals on its farms, which led to a situation of unexpected low supply but predictable high demand for protein, with pork being the cultural preference even among other options like beef, chicken and seafood.

Shortly after ASF hit China, hog prices in western Canada were around $150 per hog, with cost of production estimated at around $180, signifying a $30 loss. This period continued until 2020, when COVID-19 struck. While summertime usually spells the highest hog prices, they sunk to around $140 per hog, as costs approached $200. Producers were then losing more than $50 per hog, on shipments of about 200 hogs per week, for many weeks of that year.

Recognizing the severity of what was happening, western Canadian producer organizations – B.C. Pork, Alberta Pork, Sask Pork and Manitoba Pork – approached processors with a humble request to work toward bringing about some relief in their pricing structures. Olymel made favourable adjustments to its base pricing and bonuses, while Maple Leaf introduced a pricing floor, which temporarily kept base prices from falling too far, too fast. Separate from the producer organizations’ request, HyLife had recently introduced base pricing using cut-out (primal) values, rather than whole carcass values, which were lower. The net effect of all these changes was a small boost for producers. But, despite the efforts, which were appreciated, little could have prevented the damage that had already been done.

This situation ended up financially crippling many, as a result of that comparatively short period of market volatility alone. Some producers managed to limp through the most difficult parts, while others did what they could to escape the industry with as little collateral damage as possible.

While hog prices stabilized and became favourable through much of 2021 and 2022, costs kept climbing to historical highs. In good times, producers may have profited between $60 and $100 per hog for several weeks in the summer months of 2022, descending to break-even, at a low point, during this past winter. As of the first part of 2023, hog prices were sitting at $230 per hog, though future pricing estimates suggest this summer will be mediocre, if not outright negative. Compounding the problem, costs have yet to cool down, now upwards of $240 per hog.

It would seem that the roller coaster ride is set to continue, and for those who are unable to stomach the inevitable ups and downs, they may be looking to bow out. Should the number of active producers, once again, shrink faster than the reduced hog supply can be displaced, it will have a ripple effect on everyone, from processors and retailers, to consumers.

Producers and consumers deserve better

Despite the pork value chain’s internal struggles, for consumers, pork stands out as a candidate for being incredibly nutrient-dense and easy-to-prepare, along with being unusually affordable in the current high-price environment.

Retail pork prices by weight have actually declined year-over-year, making pork attractive relative to its red meat cousins, poultry and heavily promoted fake meat substitutes. Other categories of food – like produce, bakery and dairy goods – have increased.

And while the Canadian public should be encouraged to keep purchasing pork – undoubtedly, a mutual benefit for the consumer and industry alike – it may enhance their understanding if they took a deeper dive into the parts of the value chain that are less observable to the average person.

In the absence of clear answers to questions around food prices, and solutions to bring them closer to what is considered ‘fair,’ consumers will continue to eat. For the vast majority, that means frequenting grocery stores, often with few true options or cost savings to be had. Unfortunately for consumers, just like producers, most of the bargaining power does not belong to them.

At the same time, as pig prices fail to represent an equitable share of producers’ efforts, and as processors grapple with treacherous territory in the global pork marketplace, farmers and meatpackers will continue to deliver their products – feeding Canadians and the world. But for how long can it last in an economically sustainable fashion, under current constraints?

Consumers should not feel guilty about buying pork at discounted prices – hypothetically and unintentionally on the backs of producers – but they should keep searching for the reasons why grocery prices are the way they are, no matter the food item. Producers, too, will keep pressing.

By Lexie Reed

Editor’s note: Lexie Reed is a food animal veterinarian based in Lethbridge, Alberta. She can be contacted at lexiereedvm@gmail.com.

Swine health is an important and popular topic every year at the Banff Pork Seminar, and 2023 was no different. This year, breakout sessions included information about Streptococcus suis (Strep suis) and Escherichia coli (E. coli) in the nursery, along with a veterinary practitioner’s perspective on circovirus in the present and future.

Brooke Smith of Cargill Animal Health and Nutrition, and Ryan Tenbergen of Demeter Veterinary Services, led these respective sessions, focusing on what should matter to producers.

Strep suis and E. coli in the nursery

Smith led session attendees through novel health management tools for the purpose of improved nutrition – an area of innovation that combines her Doctor of Veterinary Medicine with her PhD in swine nutrition.

“Increased virulence of common pathogens and increased resistance to antimicrobials creates an opportunity for additional health management strategies. If we know the mechanism by which a pathogen causes disease, that can give us a clue as to what nutritional intervention is best able to target the pathogen,” said Smith. “When it comes to nutritional interventions, I have two approaches I can take: directly interfering with the pathogen’s ability to colonize the pig, or improving the immune system’s response to the presence of the pathogen.” 

These approaches can be deployed on common nursery pathogens like Strep suis and E. coli. Strep suis infection in nursery pigs is often a function of combined factors: primarily, concurrent viral disease, ventilation and temperature; genetic predisposition; high stocking density; and dietary changes.

“All commercial pigs are a carrier of at least one serotype of Strep suis,” said Smith. “When we move pigs into a nursery, some pigs have never seen the serotype that the other litters have. We combine all of those external stressors to a naïve population that is faced with a serotype they have never seen before, and it creates an opportunity for clinical disease to occur. Tonsilar epithelium is the predominant site of colonization in Strep suis serotypes found in North America.”

Nutritional strategies to limit colonization include using amino acids to manipulate pig growth rate and to increase nutritional support towards the immune system. Smith and her team at Cargill are exploring how reducing amino acid concentrations in the diet early in the nursery phase could help, by diverting these amino acids away from rapid growth, which puts metabolic stress on the pigs, towards the immune response. And then there are functional proteins, like plasma, that directly contribute to improved immunity.

“Because that infection is not localized to the gastrointestinal tract, and Strep suis spreads systemically after it colonizes the tonsils, I need to start thinking about nutritional strategies that are absorbed, metabolized or circulated, rather than just having an effect at the site of the intestine,” said Smith. “Not only is plasma a highly digestible and palatable source of protein, it also contains compounds like immunoglobulins that bind pathogens in the gastrointestinal tract, which is work that the immune system would have to do otherwise.”

Phenolic compounds – the natural defense molecules in plants – have direct antimicrobial properties and can be added to the nursery diet.

Another ubiquitous nursery pathogen that Smith and her team are working on addressing is E. coli. The site of colonization of E. coli in the pig is the small intestine, where it binds specific receptors on enterocytes – the cells lining the interior surface of the small intestine. The expression of these receptors can be up- or down-regulated by age, genetics and prior or concurrent gastrointestinal disease like Rotavirus and coccidia. The severity of E. coli infection is increased by cool and damp environments, poor sanitation, the transition to a plant-based diet, reduced feed intake and high stocking density.

“For us as nutritionists, this means that we have the potential to use ingredients that will have prolonged contact with E. coli in the gut. Or I can use the diet to create an unfavourable environment for E. coli to grow,” said Smith. “One strategy for a base diet is to increase dietary fibre. This increases the turnover of the cells lining the intestine and stimulates mucous production, which blocks E. coli from binding onto the receptor site of the cell.”

Mucilages are additives that act in the same way when they reach the small intestine. Another strategy is the use of essential oils, which can physically alter the cell membrane of bacteria and disrupt the communication between E. coli, making them less able to colonize the intestine.

While nutritional strategies can help, they alone cannot manage disease in nursery pigs.

“A number of nutritional strategies and ingredients are available, but understanding what type of pathogen is driving clinical signs, and how, is key,” said Smith. “External factors impacting exposure to, and dynamics, of disease need to be addressed. This includes managing husbandry, environment, genetics, concurrent disease and population dynamics.”

Circovirus: a practitioner’s perspective

Ryan Tenbergen led his session with an important takeaway message: “Do not forget about circovirus!” 

Circovirus vaccines, which have been available commercially in North America since the early-2000s, are largely successful at controlling Porcine Circovirus Type 2 (PCV2). However, there have been reports of PCV2 clinical disease in vaccinated herds in recent years. PCV2 causes a wide range of clinical presentations. One of the hallmarks of the disease is this varied clinical presentation and severe immunosuppression.

“In order to stay ahead of circovirus-associated diseases and avoid the potential of significant losses associated with clinical disease, we need to rethink circovirus monitoring and vaccination strategies against it,” said Tenbergen. “It’s multi-factorial. You have infectious and non-infectious causes, and then circovirus is there to cause clinical disease. Generally, alone, it’s hard to produce disease.”

PCV2 monitoring can be done with PCR testing on processing fluids, tissue or blood. A positive PCR test would indicate replicating and circulating virus in the body. Some studies have found this to be associated with negative growth performance in growing pigs, suggesting that a subclinical PCV2 infection is occurring; however, it is important to note that PCV2 is widespread in swine populations. PCV2 is in barns and circulating in pigs, but just because we find it in pigs does not mean it is causing disease.

Tenbergen stressed that when interpreting PCV2 PCR results, it is important to look at the degree of positivity and the cycle threshold (CT) value. The degree of positivity is the proportion of positive samples in a total sample submission. The CT value is the number of times that the PCR process had to be run in order to detect the virus. The more virus present, the lower the CT value will be. When there is a high percentage of positive samples and CT values are low, the more likely PCV2 is circulating at high levels in the herd.

Referring to a summary of Demeter’s PCV2 lab results, Tenbergen said, “What’s interesting is that, in 2021, there was an increase in strong positive results. Generally, as pigs get older, we see more positive results. We are more likely to find it in the finisher than the nursery.”

Tenbergen shared some case studies of farms in Ontario that presented with high mortality after weaning. On these farms, pigs would fall back after weaning. One week after weaning, pigs began to lose condition, and in two to three weeks post-weaning, mortality would spike anywhere from 10 to 30 per cent. In these herds, a co-infection with porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome (PRRS) virus was also present, and in some of the herds, so were porcine dermatitis and nephropathy syndrome (PDNS), an inflammation and dying off of the underlying skin structures that appears as dark patches of skin on the hind limbs and underside of the pig.

“If you see PDNS, it is worth investigating if PCV2 is present in these pigs,” Tenbergen advised.

In these herds, antimicrobial treatment had little effect on reducing mortality in the growing pigs. However, mass vaccination of the sow herds and an addition of a PCV2 vaccine in piglets at processing (two to four days after birth) in the short-term successfully reduced disease and mortality in the growing pig herds.

So why do PCV2 infections occur in herds that are vaccinated? Tenbergen explained that this happens when sow immunity is not uniform in the herd. When pigs are born infected or become infected early in life with PCV2, vaccination is ineffective, and the disease spreads among the growing herd. To achieve stability, gilts and sows must have immunity to PCV2 so that they do not shed it to their piglets. Vaccinating the female breeding herd achieves this goal of uniform immunity.

“I think monitoring the herd status and determining the stability of the herd should be a priority,” said Tenbergen. “With a higher PCV2 natural challenge, a one-dose program isn’t enough to carry them through their entire lifetime.”

Tenbergen explained that herds with high replacement rates in gilts are at greater risk of PCV2 instability in the sows. Incoming gilts could be susceptible to the strain of PCV2 in the barn or could bring with them a strain not present in the herd. PCV2 has the ability to re-combine, and co-infection of more than one PCV2 has been reported in Canadian diagnostic lab data.

Tenbergen noted that it is common for replacement gilts to receive only one dose of circovirus vaccine at weaning. In addition to PVC2, Tenbergen implored producers to consider the emerging Porcine Circovirus Type 3 (PCV3). PCV3 was first recognized as causing clinical disease in 2016. Though both PCV2 and PCV3 fall under the same broad virus family, Circoviridae, they share less than half of their genetic similarities. Like PCV2, PCV3 is thought to be endemic in herds and likely has been circulating in the swine population for years. PCV3 has also been reported to cause post-weaning multisystemic wasting, reproductive failure and PDNS. Looking at Demeter lab data, Tenbergen reported an increasing trend of PCV3 positives from 2020 to 2022. He has found three clinical cases of PCV3 in Ontario to date.

“Looking at PCV3 results, there are more positive results than negative, and the strong positive results are increasing each year,” said Tenbergen

Tenbergen reminded session participants that PCV vaccines are effective, but not perfect, and that the disease continues to evolve. His final suggestion was to consider implementing a PCV2 monitoring program in the herd and consider routine PCV2 boosters in the breeding herd. He recommended that PCV3 positive test results be interpreted in light of the pathological and clinical findings in the herd.